Introduction
The timing of any ethics on the laboratory floor poses a challenge, which has been famously described by Collingridge's dilemma of control. This dilemma claims, on the one hand, that it is hard to control a technology once it has finished developing because at that point too many parties-researchers, producers, investors-have an interest in putting it on the market. Anyone who wants to prevent this from happening, who wants to impose restrictions on its use or change the technology itself, will have to come with heavily weighed argumentsconcerning life and death-in order to reach her/his goal. Any attempt to control technologies at an earlier stage of development, however, does not have a chance of being successful either. According to the second horn of Collingridge's dilemma, efforts to govern technology during research or development cannot be productive because at that stage it is still uncertain whether these technologies will be realised at all. It is therefore unclear what could be problematic about them and difficult to determine how they need to be governed (Collingridge 1980) .
The second horn of the Collingridge dilemma implies that technologies that are being researched are not yet 'something' because there is not yet a device about whose characteristics we can speak (Johnson 2007) . It is therefore impossible to speak meaningfully about their morality. This relates to the very common intuition-expressed philosophically in Bertrand Russell's extensionalist theory (1905)-that there needs to be 'something' before we can ascribe predicates to it, including moral predicates, such as 'good', 'bad', 'just', 'generous', 'honest', 'respectful', 'democratic', etc. In the extensionalist theory, sentences acquire meaning when they are about something. The subject identifies the topic of the proposition; the predicate says something about it. Once the subject has been found, the proposition is ready to convey its information about it. But if the subject is lacking, or there is uncertainty about whether it exists or will exist, it seems a waste of time to say something about it.
This view of technology as a 'subject' to which predicates can be ascribed is nowadays often replaced by a more dynamic picture. Authors in science and technology studies, as well as in philosophy of technology, abandon describing technologies as 'objects' with 'features', 'characteristics' or 'functions', and instead identify what these technologies are in relation to what they allow people to do, to experience or to be. Bruno Latour's descriptions, for example, draw attention to how technology changes how human beings act and interact, what motivations they develop for action, what skills and habits they develop, and what goals they strive to reach; Don Ihde's work concentrates on how technologies alter the human experience of the world around them, of other people and themselves (Ihde 1990; Latour 1992 Latour , 1993 . Building on the work of Latour and Ihde, Peter-Paul Verbeek developed his own philosophy of technological mediation in What Things Do (2005) , in which he analysed how understandings of human life, including understandings of the good life, always generate in contexts in which artefacts are also present. None of these authors adopt an objectifying perspective to technologies, in which sentences are articulated about technologies and are out to verify or falsify them; rather, they perceive technologies as part of contexts of interaction to which they offer an active contribution.
These inspiring dynamic perspectives on technologies, however, continue to give prevalence to technologies that have already finished developing; they rarely pay attention to the ways in which technologies in earlier phases of development differ from technologies in use. While Latour describes a technology that is being designed in Aramis and Verbeek developed an ethics of design in his book Moralizing Technology (2011), as well as in his contribution to this volume, neither of these authors thematises the distinction between actual and imagined mediations. Technologies that are being designed and technologies already in use are referred to as implying the same dynamic exchange with people. The difference is that when the technology is being designed, the interaction is imagined and it is still uncertain
